Tort—Statute of Limitations—Time When Statute Begins to Run by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1953 Issue 3 
January 1953 
Tort—Statute of Limitations—Time When Statute Begins to Run 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Tort—Statute of Limitations—Time When Statute Begins to Run, 1953 WASH. U. L. Q. 336 (1953). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1953/iss3/8 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
336 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
TORTS-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-TIME WHEN STATUTE
BEGINS TO RUN
In 1946 defendent manufactured a rifle which remained in the
hands of a wholesaler and later a retailer until its sale to plain-
tiff's cousin in 1949. Plaintiff borrowed the rifle in 1950 and
suffered the loss of an eye when the negligently manufactured
weapon backfired. In plaintiff's suit begun within one year of
the injury, the trial court gave a summary judgment for the
defendant. On appeal, held: affirmed, one judge dissenting. The
action was barred under Connecticut's one year statute of limi-
tations.1
In 1935 the Connecticut legislature changed its statute of
limitations applicable to tort actions so that it read that the
period was to run "from the date of the act or omission com-
plained of ' 2 rather than "from the date of the injury or neglect
complained of," as it had previously read.3 From this language
change the court in the principal case concluded that the legisla-
ture intended the statutory period to run from the date of the
defendant's act or omission regardless of when the plaintiff
was injured. The court held that the "act or omission com-
plained of" was committed in 1946 when the defendant put the
rifle on the market.
In a dissenting opinion Judge Frank, without denying the
power of the legislature to lay down a different rule, felt that the
majority's interpretation resulted in a method of computing the
running of the statute so illogical that a court should not impute
such an intention to a legislature in the absence of the most
clear and convincing statutory language to that effect. From
certain parts of the legislative history of the Connecticut statute
in question, considered in connection with both the legislative
history and language of other Connecticut statutes of limita-
tions, he was unwilling to conclude that the Connecticut legisla-
ture intended that the statute of limitations could run against
what was never a cause of action.4
Although the concept of statutes of limitations originated in
1. Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1952).
2. CONN. REV. GEN. STAT. § 8324 (1949): "No action to recover damages
for injury to the person,... shall be brought but within one year from the
date of the act or omission complained of ....
3. CONN. REv. GEN. STAT. § 6015 (1930).
4. Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1952).
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Roman times, our present statutes stem from the common law
attitude toward real property.5 Three different reasons have been
advanced for the enactment and continuance of modern statutes
of limitations: (1) The statutes tend to put an end to litigation
and hence to foster peace and welfare in the community; (2) The
statutes protect the defendant from stale claims and lift from
him the burden of preserving evidence; (3) A plaintiff should not
be allowed to let a claim lie dormant for a number of years and
then activate it.,,
The overwhelming majority of modern cases view the last as
the most valid underlying reason for statutes of limitations."
In most instances, the statutory language itself, either expressly
or by reasonable implication, lends support to that conclusion.8
It is essential, then, under such statutes, that there be a cause
of action which could be barred. It is not necessary, however,
that the plaintiff know of the existence of the cause of action,
nor even that reasonable diligence would disclose it to him, be-
fore the statute can begin to run.9 If, however, the defendant
5. ANGELL, LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS 6, 7 (5th ed. 1869); WOOD, LIMITA-
TIONS 9, 10, 11 (4th ed. 1916).
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid. See M'Cluny v. Silliman, 3 Pet. 270, 278 (U.S. 1830):
Of late years, the Courts in England, and in this country, have con-
sidered statutes of limitations more favorably than formerly. They rest
upon sound policy, and tend to the peace and welfare of society....
By requiring those who complain of injuries to seek redress by action
at law, within a reasonable time, a salutary vigilance is imposed, and an
end is put to litigation.
With reference to such statutes, it is stated in WOOD, op. cit. supra note 5,
at 10:
* . . [Y] et, as they are acts which take away existing rights, they
should always be construed with reasonable strictness, and in favor of
the rights sought to be defeated thereby, so far as is consistent with
their letter and spirit....
8. The statutory language of the great majority of states follows the
idea that it is the plaintiff's existing cause of action that is barred. See
32 NEB. L. REv. 127 n. 21 (1952). For a typical example see Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 516.100 (1949):
Civil actions, other than those for the recovery of real property, can
only be commenced within the periods prescribed in the following sections,
after the cau.3es of action shall have accrued; . . . the cause of action
shall not be deemed to accrue when the wrong is done or the technical
breach of contract or duty occurs, but when the damage resulting there-
from is sustained and is capable of ascertainment, and, if more than one
item of damage, then the last item.... [Emphasis added.]
For a construction and application of this section see Allison v. Missouri
Power and Light Co., 59 S.W.2d 771 (Mo. 1933).
9. Faulkner v. Huie, 205 Ark. 332, 168 S.W.2d 839 (1943); Schmiat v.
Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936); Hillel
v. Motor Haulage Co., 102 N.Y.S.2d 578 (Sup. Ct. 1950); DeLong v. Camp-
bell, 157 Ohio St. 22, 104 N.E.2d 177 (1952).
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somehow conceals the cause of action from the plaintiff the run-
ning of the statute is prevented. 10 In addition it is not necessary
that all items of damage take place before the statute of limita-
tions can begin to run; it is only necessary that some damage
(enough to satisfy the requirements for stating a cause of action
for tort) accrue.11 Furthermore, it is not material that tfhe
plaintiff have knowledge or the means of obtaining knowledge of
the existence of the damage in order to start the statute run-
ning.
12
Only one case, other than the instant one, has been discovered
in which a court has held that the statute of limitations has run
in a tort action prior to the time when any cause of action
accrued. In Hopper v. Carr Lumber Co.13 the Supreme Court
of North Carolina conceded that logically there is no cause of
action in tort until both act or omission and the resultant injury
have occurred, but said that since a considerable period of time
often separates the tvo, reason requires that the time of the
running of the statute be computed from the time of the wrong-
ful act or omission.14
10. Fravel v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 104 F. Supp. 84 (D. Md. 1952); Scar-
borough v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 190 F.2d 935 (4th Cir. 1951); see
Turtzo v. Boyer, 370 Pa. 526, 529, 530, 88 A.2d 884, 885, 886 (1952).
11. Becker v. Porter, 119 Kan. 626, 240 Pac. 584 (1925); Easter v.
Dundalk Holding Co., 86 A.2d 477 (Md. 1952); Schmiat v. Merchanfs Des-
patch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936) ; DeLong v. Campbell,
157 Ohio St. 22, 104 N.E.2d 177 (1952); Albert v. Sherman, 167 Tenn. 133,
67 S.W.2d 140 (1934).
In tort actions the courts have experienced difficulty in determining when
a cause of action first accrued. The reason for such difficulty is that some
acts are themselves invasions of individual rights and thus legal injury is
then present. On the other hand, some acts are not such an invasion and
there must occur some injury apart from the act before there is a cause of
action. See Fraser v. Atlanta Title & Trust Co., 66 Ga. App. 630, 631, 19
S.E.2d 38, 39 (1942), where the court made this distinction in decided when
the statute of limitations began to run.
12, Faulkner v. Huie, 205 Ark. 332, 168 S.W.2d 839 (1943) ; Dowling v.
Lester, 74 Ga. App. 290, 39 S.E.2d 576 (1946); Schmiat v. Merchants Des-
patch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936) ; DeLong v. Campbell,
157 Ohio St. 22, 104 N.E.2d 177 (1952).
13. 215 N.C. 308, 1 S.E.2d 818 (1939).
14. Other courts have considered differently the problem arising from
the situation where the statute of limitations involved sets the running
from the accrual of the action and where the imprudent act or omission
and the resulting injury are widely separated in point of time. On the
ground that they injury is an integral part of the "act," they have decided
that the statute did not run until the injury. Kitchener v. Williams, 171
Kan. 540, 236 P.2d 64 (1951); White v. Schnoebelen, 91 N.H. 273, 18 A.2d
185 (1941) ; Fredericks v. Town of Dover, 125 N.J L 288 15 A.2d 784 (Ct.
Err. and App. 1940); Senauk v. Bronx Gas & Electric o., 157 Misc. 948
284 N.Y.S. 710 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1936); Theurer v. Condon, 34 Wash.2d
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A comparison of the number of authorities on either side of
the question, coupled with a consideration of the generally ac-
cepted theory behind statutes of limitations, indicates the desir-
ability of the result reached by Judge Frank. His interpretation
of the legislative history of the statute, however, remains uncon-
vincing. Once the power of the legislature is granted, as it must
be, it is reasonably clear that the Connecticut legislature used
language which can bear only one interpretation in the light of
the history of the statute. If criticism is to be leveled, it should
be directed, not at the court, but at the legislature. 15
448, 209 P.2d 311 (1949); accord, Easter v. Dundalk Holding Co., 86 A.2d
477 (Md. 1952); Pollock v. Pittsburgh, B. & L.E.R. Co., 27 Pa. 467, 119
Atl. 547 (1923).
15. In DeLong v. Campbell, 157 Ohio St. 22, 104 N.E.2d 177 (1952), the
court was told that a great injustice would result from an early running of
the statute of limitation. To the forceful argument of plaintiff's counsel
the court said:
There is much persuasive force in this argument and claim, so far as
justice is concerned, but the legislative branch of the government has
determined the policy of the state and fixed the time when the statute
of limitations shall bar an action for malpractice, and the argument
addressed to us as to the time when the statute should begin to run
properly should be made to the General Assembly. Our sole function
is to interpret and enforce the legislative enactment and it is not our
function, as we have said so many times, to disregard by legislating, a
legislative enactment.
Id. at 27, 104 N.E.2d at 179.
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